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THE TALE OF TWO STUDENTS

By Frank Chodorov

They were members of the debating club at a local college, and would we please help them prepare for the debate:

> Resolved, that the Federal Government should adopt a permanent program of wage and price control.

They had good reason for coming to us. HUMAN EVENTS had made editorial comment on this debate topic in a recent issue, and the students inferred that we were something of an authority. We are not immune to flattery, and the coed debater was pleasant to talk to.

To bring the matter up to date: Before the college season opens, some five hundred colleges submit to a central committee their ideas on what ought to be debated. The committee consists of faculty representatives from four intercollegiate fraternities and a member of the American Society of Speech. These five sift the suggested subjects and draft four resolutions that seem to embrace the major ideas. The four resolutions are submitted to the member colleges; the one receiving the highest vote becomes the debate of the year.

Our editorial comment on the topic for 1951-1952 was that it is "loaded" -- the mere statement implies the acceptance of a questionable premise. The premise is that a wage and price control program is not only practical but even desirable; that goes without saying, and the only matter left open for discussion is the desirability of a permanent program. We pointed out, also, that in the current textbooks, with which we are familiar, the idea of controls is favorably treated, so that the debaters on the negative side would be arguing against what they had learned in class. If they debated well, how would they fare in their economics examinations?

II

The notebooks were made ready. We adopted the Socratic method. What is the purpose of price controls, we asked.

"To keep prices down, of course."

What made them high?

"A shortage of goods and a great demand."

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Or an abundance of money, we volunteered. The controls won't bring more goods to market and they are not intended to reduce the amount of money in circulation. They simply aim to compel sellers to accept, and buyers to quote, prices lower than those prevailing in the free market.

"You are implying", said the young lady, "that there is an immutable law of supply and demand. One of my books says there is no such law."

Immutable, we ventured, is a long word leading to a long argument. Would she be good enough to tell me what she would do, were she a dressmaker, if the fixed price of dresses were below her costs?

"I'd quit making dresses."

Unless she reluctantly accepted prices forced upon her by women who disregarded the law, we added. However, if she went out of business, there would be fewer dresses on the market. Would the price of dresses then go up or down? The question, she suggested, answered itself. So, we jumped to the Q.E.D.: that price controls had the effect of creating shortages and thus raising the prices they were designed to lower.

She demurred: "The government could go into the business."

And could sell dresses at a loss which would be made up by taxing the buyers of dresses.

"Can't enforcement agencies hold prices down?"

We traced the course of a pork chop from litter to the butcher shop, just to pick up the number of points at which prices would have to be fixed and surveillance maintained, not overlooking the hide's trip from slaughter house to the glove shop. Would it be wrong to estimate that the number of cops needed to enforce price controls in general would come to at least a tenth of the population? Would not the withdrawal of these men from productive work result in lessening the supply of goods? And, who would watch the cops?

"Well, then, are you in favor of the black market?"

We are in favor of the true market, even if it is labeled "black". The true market never can be suppressed. Even the ruthless Soviet commissars cannot do it. The students were surprised at this remark, so we related how, when the Russians reduced the value of the ruble, several years ago, they gave as their reason the large fortunes that had been built up by "profiteers" -- which was an admission that an illegal market had been in operation. (Patronized by law-enforcement agents.)

"But, Americans are law-abiding. Didn't the OPA hold down prices during the war?"

They were too young to remember, and their textbooks do not record the shenanigans under OPA. How butchers would be "fresh out" if you

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asked them to weigh the meat before your eyes; how the tails of men's shirts were cut short to meet the fixed prices; how you had to buy an accessory you didn't want, at an outrageous price, in order to get an automobile at the legal price.

"If wages are held in line, prices would automatically follow."

Under wage controls, we explained, both employer and employee become criminals if one offers and the other accepts an increase in wages. During the war, to avoid putting everybody in jail, the War Labor Board hit on the device of up-grading jobs so as to make increases in pay legal. But applications for permission to increase were too numerous for the Board to handle, and the employers in desperation resorted to under-the-counter wage boosts, in order to hold their employees (so as to fill defense orders).

"You mean that neither prices nor wages can be controlled?"

Yes, they can; in the army or in prison.

III

"Wait a minute", the coed interjected, "I've got to take the affirmative side. I need arguments in favor of controls."

That was a chore. How does one support what one holds to be a fallacy? Well, underlying every fallacy is a doctrine, and if you accept the doctrine the fallacy seems to melt away. In this case, the doctrine is that political power can make the market place jump through a hoop; there are no laws of economics to hamper the strong arm of the State. We had to accept that position, if we were to be of any help to the affirmative side.

Sticking to the Socratic method, we asked: what is the advertised social purpose of controls?

"To distribute equitably whatever is in short supply."

Like the father, we suggested, who sees to it that none of his children gets more than the others. That is what we call "egalitarianism". To argue the affirmative in this debate, we said, you must accept egalitarianism as an ideal and a possibility; you must assume that the State has the right, the capacity and the duty to allocate production and equalize consumption.

"Hold on; you're preaching Socialism."

Maybe Statism, we volunteered, is a better word. But, why get disturbed over a name?

"We don't dare mention Socialism. The students don't like it, and neither does the faculty adviser."

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Then we remembered that in the textbooks this controlled economy business is described as "democratic". Socialism is not mentioned. Putting nomenclature aside, we pointed out that the affirmative in this debate must rest its case on the goal of abolishing inequalities in the distribution of wealth and the State's ability to do so.

"What about the rights of the citizens?"

Pure fiction, we sneered. The only rights the citizens have are the privileges given him, on lend-lease, by the State.

"You mean the worker does not have the right to sell his services to the highest bidder?"

Of course not. We must keep in mind that the good of society, as determined by the State, takes precedence over the good of the individual. After all, if the worker insists on fending for himself, how can the State take care of his interests?

"But, surely, if a farmer has put his back into a bushel of potatoes, those potatoes belong to him and he has a right to sell them for whatever is offered."

It was the young man who brought up the right of property, and we had to argue that that too is fiction. In his textbooks, we said, he would learn that in our highly integrated economy the individual worker produces nothing; society is the only producer. If society produces everything, the State has a first claim on everything, and is entirely within its rights when it confiscates property (by taxation) and distributes it for the general good.

They were perturbed. This was hard to take. "You mean to say that to support the affirmative in this debate we have to take the position that the individual has no rights? That the State is supreme?"

That's your basic premise, we insisted. Once you admit that the individual has rights which the State must respect, the case for controls is lost.

IV

The students had come to us without prejudice. They were interested only in winning a debate, whichever side they took. But, when the argument for controls was related to the underlying doctrine of Statism, their sensibilities were aroused. The debate took on a new meaning; it was not an impersonal verbal joust; it was a battle of values, a contest between right and wrong -- and neutrality was impossible.

When they left, we felt that freedom is not a lost cause. It is rooted in the human soul; it cannot be eradicated by sophistry, nor obfuscated by erudition. Once it is spelled out, youth will recognize freedom, embrace it and, if need be, fight for it.

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Not Merely Gossip *A Supplement to* Human Events Vol. VIII, No. 48

By Frank C. Hanighen November 28, 1951

HOW TO STOP CHURCHILL: As everyone knows, the British Prime Minister will arrive here -- silver tongue and all -- after the first of the year. No one is under any illusions about what he is after.

The planner-spenders in the Executive here naturally welcome the opportunity to help a foreign leader raid our Treasury. However, a different attitude reigns on Capitol Hill.

Congress is in recess, but a number of members are staying on to clear up unfinished business, while others dash back to Washington for a few days on this or that matter. All these members say that when Congress assembles in January it will be in no mood to approve large sums, Churchill's eloquence notwithstanding.

He'll have to deploy some strong arguments. In our issue of November 14, we emphasized that the British are now exaggerating their plight (in the matter of gold and dollar reserves) and seem indisposed, for domestic political reasons, to adopt sound but unpopular remedies. Congress, it is believed, will be unlikely to respond to another British cry of "bankruptcy".

However, Congressional veterans (inured to such threats) may heed the warning, "security", which is always more potent. It is thought that the big argument which Churchill will raise will concern atomic bases, i.e., strategic air bases from which planes can take off with atomic bombs. Already, in a statement on November 9, the British Premier tipped his hand when he said that Britain had "every need and right" to seek and receive American help because "we took peculiar risks in providing the principal atomic base for the United States" in East Anglia; and that as a result Britain had placed itself "in the very forefront of Soviet antagonism". Churchill might have said bluntly -- no dollars, no atomic bases in England.

The argument might prove persuasive, were it not for a clinching answer. This was provided a few days later (November 12) by Senator Edwin Johnson (Colorado) in his statement that the U.S. ought to abandon any atomic bases it has in England.

The Colorado Democrat, member of the Congressional Atomic Energy Committee, said that there are a number of other places -- Iceland, North Africa, etc. -- which could provide better sites for "strategic air" to carry atomic bombs against Russia. And he emphasized that in any event "no consideration" should be given to the East Anglian bases in any discussion of whether this country should extend financial help to Britain. Johnson is also a member of the key Finance Committee.

As a matter of fact, it is known that Senator Johnson favors Spain as a base (in preference to Britain) for our air activities. This is an important point which this column, on August 15, sought to elucidate. We said then that British opposition to American rapprochement with Spain was not -- as commonly reported -- because Franco's government is "fascist", but because of bases. The British fear that the U.S. would obtain use of another country in Western Europe as an air base. If that should take place, we remarked, then Britain's bargaining power vis-a-vis the U.S. (in financial matters, for instance) would be greatly reduced.

As we go to press, we learn from authoritative quarters that air bases for the U.S. in Spain should be spoken of virtually in the present, not future, tense. We are informed that out of 8 air bases "spotted" for development by U.S. officers, four are already in "virtually complete" condition; that is, the air strips are laid

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and only gasoline storage tanks need to be expanded. Additionally, we hear, the U.S. Army is busy helping the Spanish ground forces (which would be necessary to defend such bases). At the present time, a number of Spanish officers are in American camps receiving special instruction. Some say this is the largest foreign training contingent this country has had in peacetime.

In short, Senator Johnson and his colleagues can effectively "stop Churchill" by simply saying, "We do not need English atomic bases."

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THE SUEZ FRONT: Just at a time when Americans are hoping the Panmunjom parleys will bring the boys back from Korea, a development in the Near East may cause a demand for transfer of those boys to the other end of the Mediterranean.

From sources precisely in a position to know what they are talking about, we learn that within the past week the British Government has made a surprising request of the U.S. Government: that U.S. military forces accompany British forces in all moves in the Suez Canal area. Pentagon quarters say this means naval vessels, detachments of soldiers, maybe even air units, as required.

If the British conflict with the Egyptians takes a more serious turn, this could mean war between Egypt on the one hand and joint forces of the U.S. and Britain on the other. The news has worried high officers who fear the effect of such joint action on the whole Moslem world.

The situation in the Suez area takes on an even more gloomy aspect with the report (which we have received) that the supply and repair bases in the Suez area have been reduced -- by the strike of Egyptian workers -- to about 2 per cent of normal operation. The British commander has warned that before long damaged military tanks will have to be taken to other parts of the Mediterranean for repair.

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IKE AND THE MIDDLE WEST: The Eisenhower political backers are already studying a problem vital to plans for his nomination. They want to breach the Taft hold on the Middle West. Exploration of the situation has shown that one stated objection to the General in those parts is that, allegedly, Middle Westerners do not want a military man for President. Yet, strangely, Presidential popularity polls in certain areas where this sentiment is voiced reveal that General MacArthur has more boosters for the Presidency than Eisenhower. Why this apparent double-talk against a military man, and why the preference for one General rather than another?

This odd puzzle has been explained by some observers, as follows: These areas have a large proportion of people of German stock. Of unquestioned loyalty in the last war, they nevertheless have felt that Germany was not treated squarely in the post-war period. They have no love for the Morgenthau Plan. With an understandable reticence, many of these people do not tell precisely why they don't like Eisenhower, nor why they like MacArthur. The fact is that they respect MacArthur's fair handling of occupied Japan, just as they blame Ike for his severe handling of occupied Germany in 1945-46.

Ike's boosters try to brush off this point by saying that Ike simply acted on orders from Washington and should not bear the blame. But they have no answer to a quotation which indicates that Eisenhower was no unwilling disciple of Morgenthau. In the New York Post (series of pieces from November 24 to 29, 1947), the former Secretary of Treasury relates how he sounded out Eisenhower in 1944. Morgenthau wrote: "'I want to say that I am interested in the German economy', he [Eisenhower] said, 'and personally I would not like to bolster it if that will make it easier for the Germans'. The soft peace demands, Eisenhower continued, came from people who wanted to make Germany a bulwark against Russia. True, the strength of Russia was 'fantastic'. But Russia now had all she could digest, and her present problems would keep her busy until long after we were dead. 'The whole German population is a

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synthetic paranoid', and there is no reason for treating a paranoid gently. The best cure, he concluded, would be to let Germans stew in their own juice."

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THE SCORE AMONG CANDIDATES: Taft is emerging the victor from the Congressional inquiry into the Ohio election. People may believe he's inept in foreign policy or defense measures or other controversial matters, but not that he "bought" the 1950 election in his state. It is admitted in some Administration circles that Truman's attack on the Ohio Senator has been a boomerang. The President sounded like a labor leader and it is no secret that all the labor leaders have shown, in dealing with Taft, a most appalling sense of public relations.

Eisenhower seems to be losing support from Fair Deal columnists, who at first were his strongest backers. Some of these writers now show quite obviously that they wanted Ike on the Democratic ticket; now that such a possibility has appeared unlikely, they are cooling off on the General.

Stassen is proceeding to cultivate a little corner of his own, waiting to see if the growing Taft boom won't sooner or later be followed by a reaction against him in the Party. Taft is gaining too rapidly, too early in the race. If the Taft boom shows cracks, Stassen will attempt to make a strong bid for support. The Minnesota man, by his evidence against Ambassador Jessup in Congressional hearings recently, has recovered strength in some parts of the Middle West.

All is not well in California for Warren. Easteners too easily assign all that state's delegation to the Governor. But there are many Republicans, particularly in the southern part of the state, who are disgusted by the timidity and me-tooism of Mr. Earl Warren; and they are making sounds of rebellion.

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HUMPHREY'S SPEECH: When the press reported that Senator Humphrey made a conciliatory gesture towards the South, it sounded like news. But was it?

The Minnesota Senator has long been the symbol of Northern Democratic intentions to fasten civil rights legislation on the South. Hence anything from his lips that sounded conciliatory set Capital dopesters a-chattering about a change of heart toward Dixie, a possibility that Truman will court that area, etc., etc.

Actually, the speech of Humphrey was conciliatory only in tone, not at all in substance. It was intended not for Southern ears, but for the Northern CIO followers of the Humphrey's left-wing gospel; and it portends not a softer, but a firmer -- if not tougher -- policy towards the South.

Humphrey did not yield a jot in his demand for Federal civil rights bills. The speech fooled neither Southerners -- nor Northerners. The net effect on the CIO crowd is that Humphrey is a clever statesman and even more "our man", capable of venturing, knight errant, to beard the Dixie villain.

Moreover, the episode is regarded by specialists on North-South relations as a revealing pattern of how the Truman Democratic Party will handle the South in the coming campaign.

We have suggested once before that the real shapers of the Truman Party will be the Left Wing which is quite prepared to risk losing the solid South, on the theory that they could recoup in the North. For instance, they calculate that if they lose all the Southern States but win New York, Michigan and Maryland (which they lost because of Wallace votes), and keep other '48 gains, they would have a majority.

The Humphrey speech is a portent. Truman may play it that way.

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BOOK NOTE: Just published: a pamphlet on the left-wing role of large American foundations, The Bias of Great Wealth, by Frank Hughes. Price -- 35 cents. Devin-Adair, 23 East 26th Street; New York 10, N. Y.

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Book Events

Cracks In The Kremlin Wall, by Edward Crankshaw. New York: The Viking Press. $3.50. Reviewed by William Henry Chamberlin.

This is an optimistic and readable but superficial and misleading analysis of the nature of Soviet Communist power. In one place, to be sure, Mr. Crankshaw, an Englishman who spent some time in Moscow with the British Embassy during the war, hits the nail on the head and offers a definition of the Soviet threat that deserves to be quoted for lucidity and accuracy:

"What makes the situation so formidable is precisely the combination of a natural revolutionary movement all over the world and an expansive power which, by identifying itself with this movement, is able to profit by it and, in varying degrees, to guide and control it. An expansive power, moreover, in the hands of men who believe that . . . their system must conquer the world or be conquered."

This really gets to the heart of the matter. A good deal of polemical space has been used up on the argument whether "Russia" or "Communism" is the enemy. The correct answer is: Both. The Soviet regime has taken over and profited by and been influenced by many features of Russia's autocratic past. The brilliant and eloquent Russian historian Kluchevsky summed up the Russian Middle Ages with the phrase: "The state swelled, and the people shrank." One could not find a more suitable epitaph for the Soviet regime.

But it would be a grave oversimplification to regard the Soviet state as only Tsarism with revolutionary stage decoration. The international Communist movement is a universal weapon which the Tsars never had at their disposal. There was never a political party, devoted to advancing the Tsarist cause, which could poll a quarter of the votes cast in French and Italian elections. By sending a corps of professional troublemakers into Latin America, the Soviet Union can set at naught the Monroe Doctrine as Tsarist Russia could never have challenged it.

Unfortunately, Mr. Crankshaw, after striking off one admirable definition, becomes bogged down in what might be called a Russian Nationalist interpretation of Stalinism. The Russian people, he maintains, really like being tyrannized over; and the methods which the Communists have used in Russia would not prove equally applicable elsewhere.

This brushes aside a vast amount of evidence to the contrary, including the widespread disaffection in the Soviet Union during the recent war with Germany. The record shows that the Russians actually shed more blood fighting against Communism than some of the satellite peoples, notably the Czechs and the Rumanians.

The hard truth is that the Soviet technique of government by a mixture of unlimited propaganda and unlimited terrorism is quite exportable and works just as well with Chinese and Koreans and European peoples behind the Iron Curtain as with Russians. The author also tosses off far too many glib half-baked generalizations on subjects on which exact knowledge is scarcely possible.

How on earth can Mr. Crankshaw or anyone else know that the medieval Muscovites whose recorded cultural achievement was close to zero, cherished "a profound conviction that life was a good deal deeper and harsher and more complex than we in the West pretend"? Again his "paradox" that "Russia is the most expansionist power in the world and one of the least belligerent powers in the world" is not a paradox at all, but a historical inaccuracy. Nor does it make much sense to say that "she" (Russia) "does not like going to war", unless a sharp distinction is drawn between the Russian people, who have had nothing to say on the subject and Russian governments which have often been quite ready to go to war.

And the picture of Soviet technical inferiority to the United States, accurate as regards facts and figures, can have a misleading soporific effect, since it leaves out of account the many weak spots in Europe and Asia after the war and the diversion of a vastly higher proportion of American production to sustaining a higher standard of living.

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European Supplement *to* Human Events Vol. VIII, No. 48

The views expressed in this EUROPEAN SUPPLEMENT *are those of an experienced European observer, and are interesting for that reason, but they do not necessarily reflect the views of HUMAN EVENTS—Editors.*

By BERTRAND DE JOUVENEL Paris — November, 1951

Britain and France in Economic Straits: Any program of democratic consolidation in Europe begins with Britain and France. Helping the recovery of these nations has been a major objective of American policy. Unfortunately, just when recovery should have been completed, according to schedule, the two nations find themselves in economic difficulties.

Britain and France are unable to meet their import bills. Mr. Churchill, on the 6th, startled the Commons by pointing to an external deficit running at a rate of two billion dollars a year. On the same day, Mr. Harriman's Paris representatives were told by French officials that France's balance of trade was in the red by an average hundred million dollars a month.

"Back to 1947", wrote my friend Tom Kent in *Lloyd's Bank Review.* That is, the deficit figures in dollars are comparable to those which gave rise to American Aid. Have the Europeans then failed to help themselves, as a number of my American friends predicted? As against this conclusion, let me point out that British exports have moved up in volume (eliminating price changes) by 70 per cent since 1947, and French exports by 120 per cent. Thus if these countries have reverted to their former plight it is not because they stood still.

Nor does their export performance compare badly with pre-war. As against the prosperous year 1937, Britain has increased her exports dollar-wise by 160 per cent, and France by 300 per cent. In volume, British exports stand about 50 per cent above those of 1937 and the French by about 100 per cent. In the meantime, French imports are no higher than in 1937 (in volume), and British imports are almost 10 per cent lower. Both countries should therefore have improved their external balances as against not only 1947 but even 1937. Why has it not turned out so? Some European experts find an explanation in the inflationary effects of the Korean war.

The first impact of the Korean war on European economics was a curtailment of imports (on the assumption that price increases would be only temporary) and an expansion of exports. Britain soon showed a surplus, France achieved a balance. In December, 1950, Britain proudly announced that she could dispense with Aid.

But prices of raw materials went on rising; the increase in exports failed to keep pace with the increased cost of imports. Because of the differential in price, Britain and French exports slipped from the peaks attained at the end of last year.

The present situation is thus a very difficult one. The difficulty is most urgent in the case of France because her dollar reserves are very slight, while Britain is in better shape because of dollar gains in the sterling area.

* * *

Difficulty of Internal Reform: I think it is fair to say that the deterioration in the British and French positions is due to outside circumstances. But adverse circumstances, against which no force on earth can fully guarantee either individuals or nations, are a test of elasticity. Western Germany has much the same economic structure as Britain: the rise of raw material costs was just as inconvenient

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for her as for England. But Western Germany's exports stand now 82 per cent higher in volume than at the time of the Korean outbreak, while the British exports stand only 11 per cent higher. Belgium has also greatly improved her volume of exports.

The plight of Britain and France simply accentuates the dangerous rigidity of their national economies, and the need of far-reaching internal reforms. Such reforms would, however, have to lay rough hands on interests and institutions protected by a mythology, and the prospects are therefore not promising. In England, so evenly divided, the Conservatives dare not take any action to which the Socialists might point as "Tory vengeance". The British electorate heard harrowing tales of what the Tories would do to them, and the Conservatives are not unmindful of the impresison these tales have left.

In France the situation is even worse. With the sole exception of M. Schuman, no minister is certain of lasting long enough to carry through any reforms; nor can he think of reform, harassed as he is by the daily task of placating his colleagues, members of Parliament and powerful lobbies.

* * *

Worry About Rearmament: Conditions in these two countries are not auspicious for the rearmament effort. Whatever is done in the way of rearmament must have unfavorable and unpopular repercussions on their economies. Many Frenchmen who should by tradition and inclination look with favor on the setting up of a new army, point out that if the mere backwash of American rearmament has so impaired our position, the national effort will work far greater havoc. To counter that argument, it is necessary to point out that the men are already available, though inadequately armed; that the arsenals are there, though mostly inactive; that most of the material will come from the States and that possibly some lend-lease formula will be devised for the procurement of raw materials for this specific task. Indeed, far from being the straw which breaks the camel's back, the setting up of an army of which the French could be proud would quicken the pulse of the whole nation.

* * *

Of Political Health: I see many Americans who come over here to meet politicians or study institutions. If they stay long enough, they are bound to notice the lack of springiness of the European, his defensive attitude, his general distrust of what others may do and his fear of the future. This attitude is characteristic of the common laborer, the industrialist, the minister enjoying office. Everyone thinks less of what he intends to do than of what may happen to him. A sort of palsied conservatism pervades the air.

The word "defense" recurs constantly: defense of the consumer, defense of the taxpayer, defense of the franc, defense of living standards, defense of laicity, and so on. A poll of Frenchmen would naturally find most of them dissatisfied with their condition; yet the appeals they respond to are those which trade upon the fear of change. No one "defends" the things that need doing.

The present government and its majority are most apprehensive about the "defense of the Republic"; it is their misfortune that the Republic is in no danger at all, except from itself.

This negative mood is, in my view, the cause of overall ineffectiveness on the part of a nation whose gifts do not, I believe, need underlining. It is immensely more important to understand this psychological illness than to analyze institutions: the same institutions will work well or ill according to the spirit of the nation. As for an explanation for the current spasm of debility, I offer this: a long experience of abortive actions. Nothing is more necessary to develop the spirit of a nation than the knowledge that action brings results.

Individual actions are made abortive when the ground slips away from under the actor's feet (as in the continuous process of inflation), when he does not obtain cooperation, when he is interfered with, when, in short, he cannot plan for himself. Since in this age of planning, his own purposes are superceded and defeated, he loses interest in them. In the case of France, however, trouble goes back further. Collective actions again are made abortive when they are based on false principles. Thus it has come

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as a major disappointment to those who promoted social security to discover that benefits distributed to the least favored have come out of their fellow worker's pay envelope.

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A Fit of Ideas: The case of Britain is different. The most able analysis I ever heard of the British phenomenon was offered by that fine old scholar, Professor Moritz Bonn. In his view England has suffered a fit of ideas. He points out that while France was torturing her national life and injuring her external interests, ever since 1848, by attempting to lie in a Procrustean bed of all too simple ideas, Britain was forging ahead. It was a country unaffected by geometric visions of a desirable order. Then, he contends, the Webbs slipped in the poison of abstract schemes. These have presently obtained a stranglehold upon the British mentality.

This is seen for instance in the small affair of University constituencies. The Conservatives wanted to restore some ten University seats in Parliament, the electorate consisting of the alumni of these Universities. It is not denied by anyone that these seats, suppressed by the Labor legislature, have been continuously occupied by men of talent, independent of party affiliations, who have contributed to the glory of the British Commons. Even though this is granted, there was a general outcry against their restoration, because this would introduce a change in the prescribed simplicity of the electoral system: territorial constituencies of perfectly equal size. Such was the outcry that Mr. Churchill had to lay his project aside. This illustrates the passion for uniformity that has afflicted France for over a century and a half, but which is new in England. Simple established patterns are easily accepted by the mind which they enslave. The attitude of the mind towards them is passivity, the very reverse of mental activity.

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Of Arab Nationalism: I am afraid the same servility to patterns is perceptible in the case of our Arab friends. I call them friends, because, in common with all Europeans, I like Arabs very much. We fell in love with them when we crusaded against them, many centuries ago, and learnt from them many graces of life. From Iraq to Morocco they have taken up the cry of national independence, at the very time we Europeans are discovering the need for common defense and, as I believe even more so, a reign of law reaching across political frontiers. While we are receiving American missions, and the American flag is raised on some parts of our soil, the Arabs demand the liquidation of European missions and European outposts.

Yet the need of these populations for outside help is far greater than ours. Their condition is miserable: an Egyptian paper *Al-Misri* reports that 80 per cent of the Egyptians are undernourished, that 95 per cent are afflicted by eye trouble. This is not the result of exploitation by Europeans. Indeed across the whole Arab belt, into which Europeans have come only lately (in the 1880's up to the Red Sea, except French Algeria, and after World War I in the countries the other side of the Red Sea), European activity has benefited the populations. Wherever European administration was implanted it created roads, hospitals and better living conditions. Wherever European enterprise set foot it has raised the general standard.

No one questions the desirability of local government; it is clear, on the other hand, that conditions attractive to foreign enterprise must be preserved. This realistic approach to the problem is unfortunately neglected by the local government. And such is the wave of passion hurled at us that we must presumably give way, as we certainly do not want to shoot these people for their greater good.

Yet the world we want to live in is surely not a world of strident nationalisms with each group the sole arbiter of what is right or wrong, but a world where individuals can walk without fear and develop their talents, where each man, as Horatius puts it, can guide his own sheep and sing his own song. The passionate demands of nationalism are inimical to such an aim.

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Through Self-Help or Thanks to a Patron? As I see it, the great problem of our age is far less to oppose Soviet expansion than to build up the free world. If things go well with us, we shall always be far too strong to need fear Russia. And perhaps it is in order to recall that the Russian menace, after the Napoleonic wars, seemed as great to our forefathers as it now looks to us. In a very short time, with Britain aiding France to restore its vigor, Europe stood invulnerable: indeed there followed a great age of political security and economic progress.

The whole question before us is whether the countries lying in the shadow of Russia can revitalize themselves sufficiently to have no fear of her; and indeed to set up in her neighborhood an example of successful and happy social life which must tempt away satellite and even Russian populations.

This, however, supposes that the free nations make a success of their lives by the adoption of rules of behavior profitable to them rather than following destructive maxims. And here one wonders whether this is to be achieved by the spontaneous understanding of each partner or by the pressure of the major partner: the U. S. My great hope is that it can be done by purely local efforts, that the American Republic can, after necessary temporary intervention, move out of the picture.

I write this time from Switzerland, a country which encourages such hope. Would it be so difficult for other European nations to do as well as the Swiss?

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The Example of Switzerland: This small country suffers the impact of the raw material boom as much as others, and its balance of trade is at present far into the red. Yet one hears of no balance of payments crisis. Nor is the country rent in twain as England, nor is it distrustful of its leaders like France. Switzerland is ready to repulse an aggressor with comparatively far greater forces than any of her powerful neighbors. This capacity to fight has been built and kept up without any restriction of freedom. Nor has any American financing been resorted to. Here is a country which has sought neither economic nor military aid. And yet it is one upon whom General Eisenhower can rely to guard its own passages into Western Europe.

Granted that Switzerland has escaped the destruction of the two wars. We cannot therefore maintain that others, with different experiences, might be in her position as of today. But may we not regard her as a model for the remainder of Europe? She leads all of Europe in both the degree of culture of her average citizen and in the general interest taken in public affairs. Her local newspapers are internationally reputed. A small town of 3,000 inhabitants which I visited the other evening had no fewer than five events that night: a first rate theatre show, a lecture by a member of a Himalayan expedition, a lecture on international affairs, a lecture by a famous French philosopher, a conference of Protestant ministers.

The baker with whom I had dinner, a man of intellectual distinction, a great reader of philosophy, runs a first-rate shop, bought with the help of the local bank. He is an important citizen. Incidentally, he is more dignified in manner than most ministers of our major European states.

To him the American Republic is a mighty partner in the defense of freedom, but not a patron. He would be indignant at the thought of dumping his country's problems into the lap of the U. S., nor does he want to dump the problem of his town of Payerne in the lap of the State of Vaud, or those of Vaud in the lap of the Confederacy. "Settling your own problems", he says, "is the condition of freedom, and if you do this every day of your life, then you may look to others for rescue in your extreme emergency." To the Swiss, centralization is a cardinal sin.

Can we get the mangled parts of Europe back to such wisdom? I believe so. We must hope so. For it is clear that we must eventually run into trouble if we work ourselves into a simultaneous froth of dependence and nationalism.

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